It proved possible for each of the two main negotiating groups -the developed Group B countries and the Group of 77 -to achieve a 'broad consensus' among themselves. The positions of the two groups prior to the flew Delhi conference are to be found in UNCTAD Doc. TD/56, which gives the position of the developed (OECD)countrieS, nd UNCTAD Doc. TD/38, the Algiers charter which gives the position of the Group bf 77. It did not prove possible in New Delhi, however, for the two negotiating groups to reach a consensus àn the details of the proposed General System of Preferences (GPS).
The only Visible difference of the outcome of the two conferences on this issue is that whereas at the 1964 conferences the developed countries either voted against $r abstained from voting on the referenccs resolution, at the 1968 conference the reolution was approved unanimously.
In 1964 the problem was 'o achieve agreement on whether a GPS was desirable or not, in 1968 the proble*' was whàt form, in detail,the GPS should take.
CURRENT STATUS OF TilE PROPOSAL
The resolution adopted in New Delhi established a Special Committee orn preferences, as a subsidiary organ of the UNCTAD Board.
The resolution 'cquested that this Committee should meet in November 1968 and shouldhave th objective of settling the details of the árrangements for the G.P.S. in the course of 1969.
The resolution conciudad by noting "the hope expressed by many countries that the arrangements 3hould enter into affect in early 1970".
MAIN ISSUES
On the basis of the Algiers Charter and the OECD group report (and contemporary press releases and reports) it is possible to assess which issues are likely to have been the main causes of conflict at New Delhi.
The key issues were probably: i) how to ensure that the least advanced of the less developed countries (LDCs) would, benefit from the scheme; ii) what the basis for the exclusion of specific products from the outset should be;
iii) what 'safety theasures' clauses should be incorporated into the scheme which the developed countries could invoke whri they considered that the 'disruption' of their tharkets was threatened; iv) what should be the duration of the scheme; y) what to do about existing preference systems, including reverse preferencs3s; and vi) how to ensure equal sharing of the burden of the GPS by the developed countries. These issues are very much inter-related, although it seems as if hey were treated as separate issues in hew Delhi.
Judging from the evidence available it appears that the key issue 4as the Froblem presented the least advanced of the LDCs, particularly in relation to the question of the commodity coverage of the CI'S.
In order to provide a focus for the dis cussion on preferences, the following section will briefly examine these issues and will attempt to define the main points of. conflict arising under each of them.
It does not pretend to be an exhaustive coverage, and nothing is implied by the order in which they are presented.
IThÓ Less Advanced Developing Countries
The problem is that the prefers-. nces system is only intended to cover semi-manufactured and manufactured products, with processed agricultural products beiñg pecifÏcally excluded in the OECD report.
Thus the benefits would for the most part accrue to those, relatively few, less developed countries which already have well established manufacturing sectors Those less developed countries, particular those in Africa, who are dependent on exports of agricultural products and only have a primitive industrial sector could not expect to benefit much from a preference system which excluded processed agricultural products. The Grout of 77 appear to have been unanimous in their insistence that the ca) CI'S should cover Bru3sel Uomenclature Groups 1 to 24.
On the other hand there seems to have been disagreement amàng the developed countries with the extremes represented by the U.S.A. who were in favour, of all processed or manufactured goods 'being included and by France who appear to have insisted on the total exclusion of all processed agricultural products. Between the postions of the U.S.A. and France were several countries who favoured treating processed agricultural products on a case-by-case approach.
The impasse on this issue does not seem to have been breached by the end of the conference.
Another point on this issue, referred to in the Algiers Charter, which does not seem to have been taken up in the discussion at New Delhi is that the tine limits of the GPS could be made flexible.
This suggestion in effect means that the syst would be 'rolling' in that the least advanced LDCs would continue to receive preferences after the more advanced LDCs had ceased to benefit. A rider to this suggestion was that the developed countries should take specific commitments of technical ad financial assistance to the least advanced LDCs to enable them to take advantage of the GPS.
The problem with this suggestion is that it iS in direct conflict with the deve)ioped ecuntries position that they caruot guarantee any period for the extension of preferences -i.e. they retain the right to negotiate.HFN tariff' reductions among themselves.
That the problem ox what to do about the least advanced of th LDCs is a very real problem dcee not seem to 'have been questioned.
The difficulty is what to do, about them The author's view is that the GPS should be seen as part of the glöbal aid programme. and that the country by country distribution of capital and technical assistance should take into accoun't. the expected and revealed benefits of the GPS received by the different L.DCs.
Exception lists.
The OECD report makes it clear that before the developed countries could be expected to approve of and implement the GPS they would have to be allowed to publish lists of producta for which they were not prepared to extend preferential treatment to. The rules tor the inclusion of a product in the exception lists pear to be i) where an Thcrease in imports of a product would cause injury to domestic industry; ii) where the domestic industry was classified as a sensitive industry and iii) that the burden of supporting the GPS should be equitably distributed among the developed countries, so that if several of them put a product on their exception lists others would be free to do so too, to prevent their markets fron being swamped with imrorts of the product concerned.
Unfortunately no attempt appears to have been made to give any rigorous definition to the concepts 'injury', 'sensitive', and It is obvious that these concepts could be so interpreted as to render the GPS totally useless, as al]. products of export interest to the LDCs could quite conceivably be excluded.
This issue seems to have been one in which a protectionist attitude or behalf of the developed countries sèems to have prevailed; it is only such an attitude which can give any meaning to such concepts as 'injury', 'sensitivity', and 'burden'. This is obviously: one of the rnaorissu tobe resolved in the committee set up to continue the discussion on preferences.
The economist has little to contribute to the discussion of this issue as the outcome will depend predominantly on the different strength of the various domestic induatriaipressure groups in the developed countries.
Safety Measures
If we assume that meaningful definitions are agreed for the concepts of 'injury', 'sensitivity' (9) and 'burden' then it is clear that in a dynamic world economy industries in developed countries which are not currently regarded as sensitive or subject to injury could come to be so regarded.
In this situation it is recognised that there should be some safety measures %4hich the developed countries could invoke to safeguard the interests of their industries. In the words of the OECD report "This would be necessary in order to mitigate the possible effects of increased competition in their markets, or to provide a means of safeguarding the export interests of third countrias, whether beneficiary countries or not". (TD/56, , 27.) In this connection what lias to be icihed are the relative merits of the two most discussed forms that this safeguard mechanism might take, viz.:
a system of tariff quotas under Tch if the clause was invoked the importing country would specify the quantity of imports of a product it was prepared to allow in at the preferential rate of duty, with all imports above this figure being subject ts the full HFN rate and other applicable barrieral a system which if invoked would allow the importing country to limit the quantity of imporls of the product concerned to some specific figure, such as a proportion of total domestic consumption, or domestic production, or the previous years imports
The strongest supporter of the first system has been the U.S.A., and of the latter, France.
Duration of System
The OECD document makes it very çlear that the GPS is intended by them to be "temporary and subject to periodic review", it is to be regarded as a waiver of the GATT rules and not an obligation. The period suggested in the document is ten years "subject to a major review before this period elapsed in order to determine in the light of circumstances then prevailing whether special treatment should be continued In contrast to the OECD position is that of the LDCs. In the Algiers Charter they requested that the GPS be an arrangement which would "last for 20 years and (which) should be reviewed towards the end of this initial period.
In any event the preferential treatment should not there Hfore be abruptly terminated." (Page .lO,Yh.) Despite the obvious conflict of opening positions of the two sides on this issue it does not seem to have taken up rauch time at New Delhi.
The The problem, here is to define the ont. enion of elegibility for participation in the scheme.
If comDetitiveness is to be the criterion, as would be implied by the exclusion of Hong Kong, then several countries which could hardly be regarded. as developed -e.g. India, Pakistan, Taiwan, and llexico -would be in danger of fairly early exclusion from the GPS.
The issue here is whether the moving spirit underlying the GPS idea is derived from the aid argument or from the 'infant economy' argument.
'Need for preferences' is an ambiguous concept.
Existing Preference Systems
It seems to have been generally agreed (except by the French) that This, it was argued, could involve considerable hardship for some of the less developed countries benefiting from the existing systems (the author is not convinced of this) and it seemed' generally agreed between the two groups (Group B and the Group pf 77) at UNCTAD that these countries should be compensø ated for any losses they might expenienqe (the author is not convinced of the logic of this agreement either).
The form of words which reflects the agreement reached on this issu is perhaps represented by the followirg sentence taken from the Algiers Charter The new system of preferences should ensure at least equivalent advantages to developing courtries enj eying preferences in certain developed countries 10 enable the to suspend their existing preference on manufactures and semi-manufactures."
The difficulty which remains is that it is totally impos;ible to quantify the concept of "at least equivalent advantages".
Xt is worth noting on this point that the Commonwealth countr1ee
expressed their willingness to forego their Commonwealth preferences in order to participate in the GPS, as long as the "at leastquiva1ent advantages were fourthcoming.
the. French and Fnancophle
African countries, however, seem to hav4 insisted that the GPS should be so designed as not to conflict with the benefits of discriminatory preferences received by the Associated States of the E.E.C.
Reverse Preferences
The U.S.A. hs more or leso made it a condition of its acceptance of the GPS that existing arrangement uhderwhib some developed countries receive prefer.t ential tariff entry to the markets of some developing countries should be abolished,
Of the developed countries currently benefiting from such arrange-*nents it appears that only France took the opportunity presented by New Delhi to make it a major issue.
From the evidence it seems that France took the Dine that the 'costs,' to the developed Countries concerned of abolishing reverse preferences should be regarded as part of the burden they were Iearing in supporting the GPS. This rould seem to have been a tactical move en the part of the French, in an attempt o forestall some of the criticism of he exception list they will eventually roduce,
Burden Sharirtp
This was not an issue at the New Delhi conference in the same way as those examined above were.
Much was made of the notion by the developed countries in tleir deliberations in the OECD Special Group, as is iadicatedby the, report of the group submitted to UNCTAD.
To the author 'burden sharing', or even the notion of the GP$ representing a 'burden' at all, is totally meaningless.
Can the replacement of uncompetitive, previously protected, domestic production by cheaper. imports ever be suitably termed a 'burden' to the importing country? Attention might be usefully directed to the question of whether the concept has been introduced as an evasive tactic by the developed countries to justify the (11) restrictiveness of their negotiating position on various aspects of the GPS, or whether the notion really does refer to a phenomenon which threatens the successful and meaningful implementation of the GPS.
Further Topics for Discussion,
The author would like to suggest two ftther topics for consideration, without developing them here in an detail.
The first is concerned with the likely impact of the successful implementation of the GPS The second is cOncerned with how, the developed countries might best provide for the accommodation of the GPS in their overall economic planning. It seems as though the proposera and opposera of the scheme have bSn content to discuss the scheme entirely in relation to either the export prospects of the LDCs taken as a group or in relation to its impact on the protected industries of the developed countries.
Two questions present themselves as candidates for early end urgent research.
1)
Would the GP encourage the rationalization of the location of the world's industry, as the supporters of the System have claimed, or would it result in the emergence of a situation ar'allel to that prevailing in the primary commoditvt market -i.e. surplus production of a variety of manufactured goods? Now would the distribution of market opportunities amongst the various LDCs be determined? 2) Would the type of indue trilization that the GPS encouraged be consistent with the efficient and equitable development.of the LDCa benefiting from the System? Accommodation of GPS by Develoyed Countries A major problem 0f the GPS, ati11
to, be faced, is 'that of selling it to the legislatures, induStrialists, and public of the developed countries.
It is important that when this time comes the whole notion of burden sharing must have been entirely removed from the debate.
The public relations work for the GPS should be based on the line that it is in the developed coLintries own interests.
It should be shown that the GPS is complementary to the Kennedy ..Round for. exaiai4e and to any further moves toward trade liberalization on a global scale which may be being considered at that time.
It could even be argued that such a scherne was essential if full advantage was to be taken by the developed countries of the opportunities for expanded trade among, themselves.
